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Lonely Sounds:  
Sonic Self Sufficiency,  
Personal Control, and Social Shields
Chris Rasmussen
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Abstract
In the winter of 1979 Sony introduced a hand-held cassette player called the 
Walkman—a device that catered to a mass culture that had come to demand 
personal control over the musical experience. The Walkman’s mobility allowed 
for unprecedented individual control over the environment: a barrier that 
kept unwanted sounds or unwanted others out. In the post World War II era, 
loneliness and recorded popular music became linked. For both the performer 
and audience, the musical experience had become more solitary and mediated 
over time. This separation occurred in the context of a historically individualistic 
culture that was placing ever-greater emphasis on the self. By the 1970s the 
celebration of the autonomy and sufficiency of the individual had been taken 
to new extremes with consequences for all aspects of American life. The story 
of popular recorded music’s journey out of the public and into the personal, 
therefore, represents only one part of a larger national story that includes 
privatized leisure generally, the expansion of the suburbs, the emergence of 
niche marketing, individualized spirituality from “born again” Christianity to 
New Age mysticism, and the emphasis on control over the body. It is a story 
that also includes the collapse of political consensus, increasing cynicism, and 
the rise of the new right. The lonely listening style of the late twentieth century 
therefore should concern anyone interested in the American experience.
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Moe Berger, a rig-building fanatic, “set the cart before the horse” 
and attended his first live concert in 1957. Years earlier, Berger had 
become a high fidelity enthusiast following a successful sonic simu-
lation of an earthquake on a “rig” composed of high priced audio 
equipment. Since that moment his desire to simulate sounds had 
expanded to include music, and in a humorous contribution to Pop-
ular Science he related his disappointment when he showed up live 
and in person to experience the real thing with musicians and an 
audience. He realized that for the first time in his adult life he could 
not “adjust the damping control on the amplifier or set the equal-
ization curve on the pre-amp.” Even worse, for someone who had 
spent years allegedly seeking to recreate the magic of the real thing, 
the concert hall “strings lacked presence,” and “the music lacked the 
depth of stereo.” Berger wondered, “where was the explosive force 
from the percussion?” It dawned on him that he was a captive, pow-
erless, and ultimately unhappy audience member. He felt alienated 
even though he was surrounded by his fellow concert-goers. “The 
concluding applause,” he noted glumly, “did not stir my emotions.” 
It was easy to hear—high fidelity was simply “better sound.” Ponder-
ing the fantastical works Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms would have 
created had they had access to modern recording equipment, Berger 
concluded that he would not trade “my twin triaxial speaker systems 
for the best seat in Carnegie.”1       
Berger’s position remained heretical for most true believers in high 
fidelity, but for those novices entering the world of quality sound in 
the sixties and seventies, his position was hardly radical. This was es-
pecially true for young consumers, who through their experiences with 
Top 40 radio and rock records understood that music could be merely 
sound alone and that it was best experienced alone in its recorded 
form. The applause and the audience were irrelevant, or at best kind of 
local color. As the hopes for social renewal faded and national frustra-
tion rose as the 1960s transitioned into the 1970s, Berger’s attitude 
toward personal control over recorded would become widespread. As a 
result, the music listening experience transformed.
In the winter of 1979 Sony introduced a hand-held cassette player 
called the Walkman—a device that catered to a mass culture that had 
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come to demand personal control over the musical experience. The 
second generation—Walkman II—released three years later, would 
sell over 2.5 million units, and in the process become a cultural phe-
nomenon. Sony’s success lay in that it recognized the appeal of the 
Walkman to the late 1970s consumer. The initial ad campaigns cel-
ebrated the diversity of Walkman listeners. According to the com-
pany’s advertising, Walkman users ranged the spectrum from young 
and liberated women to tradition bound Buddhist monks. Unique 
individuals consumed in the Walkman a vision of themselves that 
the machine not only reflected but also enhanced. By the mid 1980s, 
Sony was designing different Walkman’s for separate niche mar-
kets—it had “lifestyled” the Walkman.2 Control and privacy, shaped 
Sony’s marketing efforts and the product became associated with the 
young, the physically fit, and the tragically hip, all of whom could at 
any time and in any place summon any sound their heart desired.
The popular demand to have personalized sound follow the indi-
vidual into public space was not new in 1979; transistors had made 
that possible with radio in the early postwar era. What had changed 
was the amount of control Americans possessed over the sound and 
the meaning of listening alone in public. Whether in their room or in 
the public, Americans shaped their sonic environment, seeking mu-
sic, solace, protection, and empowerment through recorded sound.  
Retailers began noticing in the early 1960s that playing music to 
customers on headphones, rather than via a traditional speaker ar-
rangement, resulted in doubling the sale of records.3 By the 1960s 
listeners found that there was something desirable about being im-
mersed in sound that no one else heard. High Fidelity, the grand 
organ of audiophiles, kept a close eye on portables—as it did on 
all aspects of sound recording technology. The magazine, however, 
tended to see portables as an afterthought—something an audio-
phile might take on vacation, but only because hauling the rig along 
was not practical.4 Other portables of the 1970s marketed their 
wares as psychedelic mind benders. “It’s like listening with your 
whole body,” declared an advertisement for the “Boom Box.” Bass 
notes came with a “blast of air” allowing one to not only hear but 
also “feel the boom box.”5 
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Sony, on the contrary, never claimed that the Walkman would 
overwhelm the individual, or that it was a pale imitation of a sta-
tionary audio system in one’s room. The Walkman instead was better 
than all other music systems because its mobility allowed for unprec-
edented individual control over the environment. Not only did the 
user get a soundtrack, but a barrier that kept unwanted sounds or 
unwanted others out. Sony marketed the Walkman as a device that 
would enhance the powers of or protect the user—making the lis-
tener more of who they already were. Music as shield and music as 
performance enhancer—this was the twin appeal of the portable for 
joggers and postmodern urban flaneurs.
Sony’s chairman and public spokesmen/philosopher, Akio Morita 
saw the success of the Walkman—before it was a fact—as the in-
evitable result of the cultural zeitgeist. Everyone, he told Rolling 
Stone in a 1980 interview, would soon have their own personal stereo. 
Those in rural areas, or those who spent the day out doors would no 
longer have to suffer sounds not of their own choosing. It is hardly 
surprising that Morita would predict the overwhelming success of 
his company’s product. What is striking, however, is his assumption, 
apparently one shared by Rolling Stone, that the best music was en-
joyed privately. It was understood that those outside and in the pub-
lic—though certainly not living in silence—had nonetheless been 
missing something essential and would welcome the chance to more 
completely manage their sonic environment and in the process seal 
themselves off from the distractions, including other people, who 
currently surrounded them.6 
The portable cassette player was, in Morita’s view, the logical next 
step in the ongoing sonic fight to combat seventies feelings of in-
dividual weakness and powerlessness. Unlike the room-bound high 
fidelity rig, it did not keep one cooped up indoors, yet neither did it 
expose one in the unpredictable public realm. Its private noise and 
public silence gave one the opportunity to be both among people 
and yet remain apart—making the Walkman simultaneously (and 
seductively) subversive and safe. “We do not return to individualized 
or privatized emotions when we use the Walkman,” Rey Chow said 
extolling the device’s liberating and revolutionary aspects, “rather the 
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Walkman’s artificiality makes us aware of the impending presence 
of the collective, which summons us with the infallibility of sleep-
walker.” That presence, however, is not forced upon the individual by 
“the loudspeakers of history” that radio or the public address systems 
of the past had.7 It did not overwhelm, rather the Walkman at last 
permitted the listener to resist the siren song of the collective with-
out having to hide away in one’s room. One could be public without 
the fear of losing one’s individuality. The mobility, the smallness, and 
the accessibility of the Walkman were its greatest assets, allowing it 
to obliterate any lingering traditional understanding of music that 
emphasized the social nature and sense of collective obligation in-
herent in a live performance.
Personal control was the defining feature of the 1970s listen-
ing style—the proponents of portable stereo sound argued that the 
new technologies of control expanded democracy and empowered 
the individual at the expense of the powerful corporate machinery. 
They continued the revolutionary struggle of the 1960s. That former 
counterculture mainstay, Rolling Stone, displayed an especially intense 
late-seventies obsession with the modern technology the promise 
of control. Equalizers, micros, and something as sinister sounding 
as Advent Corporation’s “Sound Space Control” excited the former 
revolutionaries at Rolling Stone more than any Springsteen record. 
“So, at your option,” Rolling Stone explained to its readers, “you could 
make, say, Abbey Road sound as if the Beatles were performing it in 
your bathroom (two-millisecond delay, wet) or in Albert Hall (sixty-
millisecond delay, dry).”8 Given Rolling Stone’s youth culture roots, 
this desire to manipulate that culture’s heroes is significant. The 
Beatles no longer were the avatars whose messages required one’s 
complete attention, but sonic clay in the hands of the modern lis-
tener. Technology provided the listener with the choice to accept the 
Beatles (or Beethoven) as intended, piecemeal, or not all.  
Electronics companies often claimed listening to recorded sound 
on expensive equipment also provided overwhelmed listeners with an 
escape from social obligations. Stanton Corporation’s 1977 playful ad-
vertisement for its quadraphonic headphones featured a series of pho-
tos in which individuals wearing the headphones avoided dealing with 
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a variety of domestic problems. In one, a woman stood with her eyes 
closed blissfully unaware of the crying baby in her arms. The man in 
the next photo smiled while working a chain saw over what appeared 
to be house beam, and in a series of three photos, a woman in curl-
ers harangued a man sitting peacefully reading a newspaper. A pair 
of Stanton headphones had relieved these three lucky individuals and 
allowed them to enjoy the music being piped into their ears and, most 
important of all, their own privacy. If, as Jean-Paul Sartre claimed, hell 
is other people, Stanton offered a tool toward isolated salvation.9 
The poverty of a modern life lacking recorded sound was illus-
trated in an advertisement featuring a stark picture of an empty 
room with four white walls, one narrow window, and hard wood 
floors. The copy read “At Technical Sound Industries There’s Never 
a Day Without Music.”10 The empty room not only appeared lonely, 
but intimidating. Private space was a prison in which modern Amer-
icans were trapped and alone. Good speakers, and by extension the 
electronic media in general, capable of delivering high fidelity sound 
counteracted the free-floating fears of isolation and loneliness and 
transformed the reality of an alienated existence into something tol-
erable, even pleasurable. And this miracle occurred not just occasion-
ally but every day. Instead of feeling a powerless prisoner, the owner 
of a high fidelity system was awash in sound over which he exercised 
complete control—making the kings and lords of the baroque era 
look like mere pikers. The Walkman, in this context, appears as an a 
predictable innovation.
High fidelity offered virtual reality before the home computer in-
dustry had even began. Not only music, but also “natural sound” and 
“white noise” had become available to listeners. Popular Mechanics 
claimed that many listeners used such noises to improve the func-
tioning of their “left brain.” Besides helping out a tired cranial hemi-
sphere, recorded sounds of frogs croaking and tides crashing could 
improve one’s love life, quality of sleep, and concentration.11 The au-
thor identified psychoacoustics as a new pharmaceutical, a quick and 
enjoyable curative for neurosis.
As the above examples suggest, the 1970s obsession with con-
trol of one’s sonic and social environment was not an indication of 
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the individual’s strength, but rather its opposite. Sociologist Richard 
Stivers has labeled devices such as Walkmans “stimulus shields.” By 
creating a sonic bubble around the individual in the public sphere, a 
stimulus shield protected a weak individual from loneliness as well 
as from the perception of being alone. These devices became increas-
ingly necessary to postwar Americans. In a competitive and individ-
ualistic society, face-to-face were more ambiguous, threatening, and 
undesirable. Relationships mediated by communications technolo-
gies protected the individual. The more one was disconnected from 
face-to-face interaction and conflict, however, the more one needed 
protection. Thus the existence of the stimulus shield fed the need for 
ever-stronger shields.12 
The Walkman, which was marketed from its inception as a tool 
for the self-confident, instead can be better seen as one of despair 
and a symbol of a culture beset by insecurity and alienation. Embat-
tled individuals lacking the resources or the public space in which to 
reconnect turned instead to the very devices that are pushing them 
further apart. The desire for sonic self-sufficiency has resulted in an 
era of lonely sounds. Wrapped in their own sonic environment, the 
Walkman user was a microcosm of his culture.  
In the post World War II era, loneliness and recorded popular 
music became linked. For both the performer and audience, the 
musical experience had become more solitary and mediated over 
time. This separation occurred in the context of a historically in-
dividualistic culture that was placing ever-greater emphasis on 
the self. By the 1970s the celebration of the autonomy and suf-
ficiency of the individual had been taken to new extremes with 
consequences for all aspects of American life. The story of popular 
recorded music’s journey out of the public and into the personal, 
therefore, represents only one part of a larger national story that 
includes privatized leisure generally, the expansion of the suburbs, 
the emergence of niche marketing, individualized spirituality from 
“born again” Christianity to New Age mysticism, and the emphasis 
on control over the body. It is a story that also includes the col-
lapse of political consensus, increasing cynicism, and the rise of 
the new right. The lonely listening style of the late twentieth cen-
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tury therefore should concern anyone interested in the American 
experience.13 
Americans’ relationship to popular recorded music and its tech-
nologies provides a window through which to understand how elec-
tronic media and information technologies have effected social be-
havior. Along with stereo rigs, televisions and personal computers 
have long been identified, among a host of other things, as hedges 
against loneliness and tools to banish unpleasant moods. As with 
recorded music, Americans used these devices at home and often 
alone and in the process altered their relationships with their fami-
lies, friends, neighbors, and citizens. A wide cross-section of observ-
ers have agreed that in the postwar era growing, social disconnec-
tion was related to the peculiar uses for which Americans created 
for their media and the technologies, with impressive psychological, 
social, cultural, and political consequences.14 
In psychology and communications studies, scholars have blamed 
media technologies—from the radio, to television, the to computer, 
for degrading social connections. Brian Spitzberg and Daniel Ca-
nary noted that Americans had incorporated the electronic media 
into their lives as a form of private practice in ways that potentially 
exacerbate the growing problem of loneliness in American life. Most 
Americans, the pair contend, spend their lives moving in and out of 
loneliness and are thus “situationally lonely.” This is a normal, or at 
least transitional, state. A smaller group of Americans, however, are 
trapped in loneliness—the chronically lonely. They are alone, or feel 
that they are, and have become resigned to a reality in which rein-
tegration is no longer possible for them. The chronically lonely also 
tend to be heavy users of electronic media. This is despite the fact 
that they do not believe, as the situationally lonely do, that television 
or radio has any socially therapeutic qualities.15 
Electronic media pose a problem for the situationally lonely, how-
ever, because they replace other activities, and offer a new and rela-
tively stress-free style of relating to others as well as to internal emo-
tions. If a television or a record collection is used “instrumentally” 
to help extricate one from loneliness, the media may in fact end up 
producing the opposite result in the long term. “It is feasible,” Spitzer 
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and Canary suggest,” that as social skills deteriorate, people engage 
in reutilized behaviors that exclude, inhibit, or diminish functional 
behaviors. As loneliness persists, people become more habituated 
and less instrumental users of media.”16 The use of electronic media, 
on the rise for a number of “instrumental” reasons at home and work, 
holds the potential to damage or distort the social fabric.
Along with deteriorating interpersonal bonds, the social discon-
nection associated with using electronic media has weakened the na-
tion’s political culture. Robert Putnam has argued television arrived in 
the postwar era and ensured that Americans stayed put in their new 
suburban homes. Television not only ended nightly visits, it turned the 
outside world into an abstraction, privatized leisure and civic activity, 
and encouraged the formation of “pseudo connections” that required 
little effort and dissolved all too easily. By watching television—no 
matter its content—Americans learned how to cultivate loneliness, 
and community and civic institutions withered along with everyday 
civility. As television viewing replaced social and civic activities, it led 
inevitably to a diminution not only of the viewer’s social skills but 
also his political inclinations. A chronic television viewer, Putnam 
maintained, became passive and convinced of his own powerless-
ness. After its effects had been internalized by the baby boom genera-
tion by the 1970s, the consequences of television viewing manifested 
themselves in numbers that showed skyrocketing rates of depression, 
falling rates of voter participation in national elections, and individual 
engagement in local government. Television, along with suburbaniza-
tion, provided the context in which a political culture dominated by 
fear, apathy, and well-funded corporate interest groups developed: a 
culture of lonely and alienated individuals. For Putnam, the future of 
American democracy depends upon Americans changing their pres-
ent relationships to the electronic media and with each other.17
Systematic psychological inquiry into television’s relationship to 
loneliness began in earnest in the 1970s, when researchers revealed 
that television had replaced a number of social activities and seemed 
to have degraded the expression of the affect in the American house-
hold. Not only did television lead to less conversation, but it reduced 
the number gestures and behaviors normally associated with socia-
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bility: smiling, eye contact, “forward lean,” touching, and conversa-
tion. By 1978, television owners reported spending more than 10 to 
15 percent more time watching television than engaging in conver-
sation. Time spent on household rituals, from family meals, to bed-
time activities, and holiday celebrations similarly declined. Television 
viewing in this context could be regarded as an addiction, a compul-
sion not unlike alcoholism.18 
Outside of McLuhan, few observers placed any great social value 
in television, but the same cannot be said for personal computing 
and information technology. According to their progressive advo-
cates, computers would empower individuals and the web would 
bind them together in voluntary and democratic associations creat-
ing a revolutionarily holistic social ecology. 19 
A counter-critique, however, also exists. In a pioneering and pro-
vocative study of the subcultures that developed around personal 
computing, Sherry Turkle argued that the individual personal com-
puter of the 1970s and 1980s offered disillusioned 1960s male seek-
ers a realm in which they gained the power to realize their social and 
personal visions on their own terms.  Theirs was a style of computing 
“characterized by transparency, simplicity, and a sense of control…
The computer clubs that sprang up all over the country were im-
bued with excitement not only about the computers themselves, but 
of the new kind of social relationships people believed would follow 
in their wake.” 20 Yet, just as with music and television, the obsession 
with control would produce greater social distance. 
Echoing the early Rolling Stone at its most messianic, the organs 
of the early computer movement adopted as an article of faith that 
information technologies associated with the Internet would create 
“knowledge cooperatives,” which would induce an inner revolution 
among the technologically linked up, bringing into existence par-
ticipatory democracy and a postmodern and enlightened community. 
The missionary zeal of men like Apple founder Steve Jobs, whose 
company would in 2000 release Ipod—a Walkman for the twenty-
first century—stems from their channeling of their disillusionment 
with long-player style social renewal into the equally solitary pursuit 
of building hardware and writing software.21
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The actual communities that sprung up organically around com-
puters and connected themselves together in the Web were quite 
different than the dreams in Byte or Whole Earth Catalog. The young 
men who came of age in the 1970s and 1980s and became enamored 
with computing technologies and used their understanding of and 
control over computers as markers to set them apart. These young 
men were more familiar with machines and, perhaps as a result, less 
at ease with other people. Their mastery of the computer, though it 
often blocked them from the majority of the peers, allowed them 
entry into the community of “hackers.” Unlike the disillusioned rev-
olutionary but similar to Canary and Spitzberg’s chronically lonely 
individual, the hacker put little faith in restored social relationships. 
Rather he invested himself in the machine itself. Most of the hack-
ers Turkle encountered were socially awkward and feared the unpre-
dictability of social situations over which they had less than absolute 
control, as one hacker concluded about he and his companions fail-
ures in dating,
I think computer hackers tend to get very strongly involved in 
relationships. This is because they are used to having this very 
close, clear, intimate relationship with the computer and they 
expect to have the same kind of relationship with a girl. They 
expect to understand the other person more than is reasonable. 
People just don’t work like computers.22
Not only did hacker culture contain within it antisocial and anti-
romantic elements, but it was distinctively anti-sensual. In the same 
way television reduced reality to an abstraction,23 and recording 
technologies reduced the performance and to sound waves. Com-
puting when combined with the Web reduced experience to infor-
mation and offered in its place “virtual reality”—a life on the screen. 
For Turkle, however, the hackers did not represent an isolated group 
of cultish individuals, but a canary in the cultural coalmine.  
… [T]he computer offers hackers something for which many 
of us are hungry. Hysteria, its roots in sexual repression, was 
the neurosis of Freud’s time. Today we suffer not less but dif-
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ferently. Terrified of being alone, yet afraid of intimacy, we ex-
perience widespread feelings of emptiness, of disconnection, of 
the unreality of the self. And here the computer, a companion 
without emotional demands, offers a compromise. You can be 
a loner, but never alone. You can interact, but never feel vulner-
able to another person.24
The computer, by being personal and by at least mimicking the 
most rudimentary aspects of thought was an acceptable stand-in for 
human contact. It also possessed the important virtue of being under 
the user’s control. It was a machine that would not expose or hurt 
the user. Like the well-set up rig or the Walkman, it was a sanctuary 
where the self could feel more itself and allow it to connect. Its anti-
sensual nature, however, and its relentless reductionism only exacer-
bates the anomie Turkle describes. 
The World Wide Web, which enjoyed a great deal of favorable 
press and some wild-eyed utopian dreams, has also exhibited the 
same pattern as the television, the computer, and recording tech-
nologies. The act of learning how to use the Internet and the Web 
has been shown to increase loneliness, even if the users were directly 
communicating with another person over the Web. “…[E]ven social 
uses of the Internet were associated with negative outcomes,” con-
cluded a famous 1998 study of the Internet and loneliness, “for ex-
ample, greater use of electronic mail was associated with increases 
in depression.” The Internet, the researchers discovered, substituted 
weak ties in place of strong ones, where on-line associates, detached 
from the day-to-day environment of each other, cannot effectively 
connect or sympathize with each other. Despite the disturbance it 
had caused in the lives, most of the study’s Internet users returned 
to the technology because of the ease of escape and connection it 
seemed to offer.25 
The personal listening devices that became common consumer 
items by the 1980s are a key element in a much larger history. Post-
war Americans, living under the threat of atomic annihilation and 
often in subdivisions of strangers, desired a safer world in which un-
certain human relationships that were ever more distant, were held 
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at arms length. The individual having lost connections to others, 
sought technological empowerment. Music listening devices offered, 
just like the computer, the personal control that seemed to be rapidly 
disappearing in all other areas of their lives. Shielding the user from 
social obligations even down to the innocuous “hello,” and by be-
stowing upon the listener the power to bring into existence a unique 
sonic environment, personal listening devices seemed to satisfy the 
late twentieth-century’s radical individualism. The problem was they 
also only made the desire for control stronger, making the machine 
ever more necessary. 
Musical performance continues, of course, but it is safe to say that 
most of the time Americans do not hear music from other human 
beings, but call it into being from a host of different technological 
devices. Cheerful Luddites, such as the former rock and roller Jona-
than Richman, still travel from place to place performing for small 
audiences, but his music, like that of other popular musicians, is 
much more accessible as digital information on iTunes.  
Opportunities for collective musical experiences remain, but most 
Americans opt for the solitary or the technologically mediated. In 
the spirit of Top 40 radio format founder and market populist Todd 
Storz, the music and electronics industry have given them what they 
demanded. That demand will remain strong for the foreseeable future 
because the social anxieties and anti-sensuality of the current culture 
show no signs of abating. It would seem that the psychological ill 
health of Americans is one of the key elements powering economic 
growth, technological innovation, and musical artistry
Chris Rasmussen14
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